◆ SpookStack

45. (Continued; The vulnerability of the U-2 to Soviet SA-2 systems and the discovery of those systems in Cuba contributed further complicating factors in weighing risks against the need for hard intelligence. The situation as of September 1962 must be viewed against this background of universal repugnance, or, at the very least, extreme uneasiness regarding overflights. Because of the widespread apprehension over use of the U-2, we took particular care to ensure that each flight produced the maximum of information of value to the entire intelligence community. Each track was drawn to cover high prio: ity targets agreed upon by an inter-agency group known as the Committee on Overhead Recon- naissance, a committee of the Un ted States Intelligence Board. We were also concerned w.th the conservation of the asset. The U-2 is not a sturdily-built aircraft. It 1s designed for one purpose --long flights at very high altitudes and at relatively low speeds. We had very few of these planes. Therefore, before we committed one to a mission we wanted to be absolutely certain that the intelligence need was great enough to justify the risk of loss of the e Cor lot and aircraft. xttee on Overhead Reconnaissance was the intelligence com: nunity's vehicle for making the target studies, ¥ & 8 All CIA over: nts were programmed through the medium of the CIA Monthly Forecast. At the time the Soviet arms build-up -3- 129