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ADocumentaryHistoryOfTheCubanMissileCrisis1962
Page 145
145 / 354
46. (Continued)
. the. 1 to 1.5 na. range, could conceivably be exployed
PSALN «- FOP-SHCRET
ANNEX: Strategic Considerations
1. In weighing their decision to install ballistic __
missiles in Cuba, the Soviet leaders sust have considered
the military utility of these weapons with and without
nuclear warheads, the targets in. the US and elsewhere which
they could reach, and the strategic value of deploying .
wissile forces of various sizes in Cuba.
2. Bocause of their type of guidance and relative <“..
inaccuracy, baliistic aissiles have utility against fixed -
targets of known location, and not against such targets
as convoys or naval forces at sea. The Soviet 700 and
1300 n.o,. missiles, whose CEP's sre estinated to be in —.:
with NE watheads against large silitary conters and urban
a¥oas. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would see
. any advantage in deployment for this purposo, but they
. Bight tegard this threat as contribution to the deterrence
’ of ‘Latin American support for US or Cuban refugee opera-
tions against the Castro regise,
°3,° Deployed 709 and 1,106 n.m. missiles with nuclear
warheads would augnent Soviet strategic striking power by
virtue of their ability to reach a number of American tare
gots with warheads having yields which are not significantly
- smaller than those of current Soviet ICBMs, From the
- present base area in Cuba, 700 n,m. missiles with nuclear
warheads could reach eastern US targets within an arc
including Savannah and New Orleans, including 7 SAC bomber
and tankor bases and at least one important naval base.
(The 350 nm missiles could reach bomber bases in Florida,.
ef which there are only two.) The 1,100 nom. missile vould
* threaten a auch nore significant number of critical mili-+ i a
tary targots, including 18 SAC boaber and tanker bases,
an ICBM base, and three major naval bases. In addition,
such targets ss the Panama Canal and US bases as-far east
as Puerta Rico cenld bo reached, Both of these missiles
have ranges sufficient to reach many US population, in- Poet
. dustrial and adzinistrative center--including, in the case
of the 1,100 n.n. cissile, ¥ashington, 9.C, Installations
of importance to the US atomic energy and space programs
also would be within range of Cuban=based 700 and 1,100
Beas Dissiles. a .
143
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