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83. McCone, Memorandum for the File, “Meetings with Mr. Krock, Mr. David Lawrence, and Mr. Scott,” 23 October 1962 MA fog October 23, 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE SUBJECT: Meetings with Mr. Krock, Mr. David Lawrence, and Mr. Seott At 12:40 Mr. Arthur Krock called at my office at my invitation. I reviewed the situation generally with him, answering questions concerning the background of the decisions, the arguments in favor of the course of action versus a blockade coupled with the political debate on the one hand and surprise military action on the other. Krock seemed in general agreement with the course cf action. At 5:00 o'clock at my invitation Mr. David Lawrence and Mr. Scott called at my office and I reviewed the situation with them. They questioned me concerning the evidence and I showed them several pictures which they accepted as convincing evidence. They questioned me in considerable detail as to why we did not know this sooner, how Keating got his information and the penetration of intelli- gence activities during the months af August and September. I explained the situation substantially ap outlined to the leadership at their meeting. I felt that neither was convinced and that both attached some “other motive" to the timing. Howaver, they did recognize that MRBM sites can be installed quickly and with very little advanced preparation which can be detected. Both gentlemen qieationed me at considerable length as to why Administration spokesmen spoke 80 categorically that the build-up was purely defensive and that no offensive capability was being installed. They were concerned about repeated ataterments by the President, Chester Bowles, the Vice President and other Administration spokesmen, but most particularly the State Department briefing held on Thursday, October 18th, which was two or three days after the original data was in cur hands, at which time the briefers again repeated the statement that the "build-up involved defensive and no offensive weapons.” They said they thought this briefing was a deceptive mistake and wondered why the briefing was carried on. 287