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4. (Continued) VAR SEGRET incompatible with Soviet policy «- and indicate a greater willingness to increase risk in US/Soviet relations than the Soviet Union has displayed so far--, 12, On September 20th McCone responded as follows: “Ref DIR 37228: Suggest most careful consideration to conclusion last sentence paragraph d. Asan alternative I can see that an offensive Soviet Cuban base will provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take an unexpected risk in order to establish such a position," 13, It is reported that during McCone's absence, Acting DCI, ata masting held in Mr, Bundy's office on 10 September, proposed an overflight which would cover the entire north and south perimeter of Cuba east of Havana and out to the eastern tip of Oriente Province except for an area in the immediate vicinity of Santa Clara where four SAM sites wers known to exist and had been photographed, The purpose of this flight was to make a final determination as to how many SAM sites existed or were under construction. It is reported that because of Rusk's concern for the safaty of the U~2 in view of the Sakolin violation on 7 September and the ChiNat loss on 10 September, the sense of the meeting (particularly that of Secretary Rusk) that CIA be permitted to make 4 flights against Cuba, two peripheral and two overflights cf limited penetration, including the Isle of Pines. These flights were executed batween 26 September and 7 October. On the i4th of September the meeting of the Special Group, JCS representative outlined capabilities for low level coverage. Secretary of Defense indicated he did not wish thia operation considered until the results were obtained from CIA reconnaissance as approved on September lth. . 14, On October 4th McCone noted to the Special Group that there had been no coverage of the center of Cuba and more particularly the entire western end of the Island for over a month, and aii flights since 5 September had been either peripheral or Limited and therefore CIA did net know, nor could advise, whether an offensive capability was being created, DCI objected strenuously to the Hmitations which had been. placed on ovarflights and there arose a considerable discuasion (with some heat} as to whether imitations had or had not been placed on GIA by the Special Group Be were requested