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12. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Director, “Action Generated by DCI Cables Concerning Cuban Lov--Level Photography and Offensive Weapons” (n. d.t Sanh MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR SUBJECT: Action Generated by DCI conte TEE occo-ning : Cuban Low-Level Photography and Unlensive Weapons 1, Based upon your proposal of Saturday, 25 August, that RF-10l's be used over Cuba, General Carter asked General Lemnitzer on 27 August about the possibility of low-level photography using RF-101 or F8U aircraft. At that time General Lemnitzer indicated : that something probably could be dug up. General Carter informed : USIB at the 29 August meeting of his conversation with General j Lemnitzer. At the Special Group Meeting the following day, General : Lemnitzer raised the issue and said that use of RF -101 or F8U air- i craft flown by US pilots would be feasible from the military point of | view. General Carter pressed the point by indicating that other types i of photography did not give sufficient detail and precise identifica- tion of certain types of equipment. After some discussion, the Group agreed to take cognizance of this matter and requested it be reopened at an appropriate time when specific targets and informa- tion needs could be identified. 2. On 31 August, after General Carter informed Mr. McGeorge Bundy and General Lemnitzer of the readout of U-2 flights showing SA-2 sites, the President called |General Carter at"1300, asked how many people had this information, and told General Carter that he wished it put back in the box and nailed tight. This freeze continued until Saturday, 1 September, when the information was extended slightly further to the working analysts. General Carter informed Secretary Gilpatric on 1 September that the General and Karl Kaysen agreed a full readout was necessary and that some low-altitude flights were needed to pinpoint the sites. 3. Not until Tuesday, 4September, did the President announce the presence of a missile defense system in Cuba. That day General Carter approved COMOR recommendations: in view of SAM sites on the western end of the island, it was particularly important that the next authorized mission should cover those areas of the island were not photographed because wea! that the complex eastern end of the isl: egain, 39