◆ SpookStack

( On the other hand, the report treats the preparations for the April landings as if these were the only activities directed against Castro and his influence throughout the hemisphere and the world. It chooses to ignore all other facets of the Agency's intelligence collection and covert actions program which preceded, accompanied, and have followed the landings in April of 1961. Thus, it does too little. The report misses objectivity by a wide margin. In unfriendly hands, it can become a weapon unjustifiably to attack the entire mission, organization, and functioning of the Agency. It fails to cite the specific achievements of persons associated with the opera- tion and presents a picture of unmitigated and almost willful bumbling and disaster. In its present form, this is not a useful report for anyone inside or outside the Agency. If complete analysis beyond that already accomplished by General Taylor and his group is still required, then a new kind of report is called for, --a report with clear terms of reference based on complete testimony. Such &@ report could concentrate on clandestine tradecraft, an asset for which the Agency remains uniquely responsible. /s/ C. P. Cabell Cc. P. Cabell General, USAF Deputy Director