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British apparently had not been completely ruled out as of mid October 1960 -- at least Jack Hawkins and ., Jake Esterline still had thoughts about such facilities. 104/ Frank Egan, Chief of ground forces training for JMATE also made a case for combining the use of bases in the Bahamas and in Florida for tactical air, air transport, and maritime operations. In mid-September 1960, the Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, went so far as to say of the Egan proposals: While these recommendations have not yet received policy approval, it is felt that operational requirements will dictate approval essentially as recommended, and that this paper combined with anticipated air and paramilitary ground material [sic] requirements (Attachments 2 and 3), will enable you to begin the development of base and transportation support require- ments. 105/ As it turned out, Egan's recommendations were not approved fo~ the use of either the Bahamas or CONUS as the site for operational strike bases. In the lengthy memorandum in which he summarized the nature of the combined Air/Maritime guerrilla attack on Cuba, Egan came up with one estimate illustrating a problem that plagued DPD throughout the duration of JMATE -- that the "air experts" on the WH/4 staff would - 84 -