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JQP 81!CRE I fine points in his analysis of government policy. It is incumbent upon us, there- fore, to get the record straight in this manner, and, although Lt. Col. Egan may have had in his own mind the idea of a strike operation -- and I believe he came to us with some idea on hitting the Isle of Pines -- this nevertheless was not approved Project or Agency policy until quite a few months later. In point of fact, as I look back over that period, I am sure during that period I found myself drifting along, devoting myself merely to creating basic capabilities in a var~ety of fields without any clear-cut idea of what national policy would permit us to do.* 21/ Richard Bissell who was the Deputy Director for Plans at the time of the Bay of Pigs operation has a * In a discussion with the author of this history in the fall of 1975, Esterline introduced another thought about the change in concept to wit: That the small team concept had been planned to be put into operation early in November of 1960, and Esterline seems to believe that this would have been feasible. 'However, the Presidential election of that year made the Eisenhower administration extremely cautious about anything that might have an impact on the out~ome of the election; and, consequently, such delays as were incurred gave added time for the build- up of Castro's internal forces. By the time that the election was over, it had become apparent that the small team concept was no longer viable. Esterline, in fact, suggested that the emphasis for the buildup in the brigade forces came from the White House. But even though Gordon Gray -- in various meetings of the Special Group during the period from November to the end of the Eisenhower administration -- did support the idea of increasing the size of the force, there is no evidence to indicate that pressure to do this came from the White House. 22/ - 162 - 'fOP Sf!CR~*f