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;r;ep SECRET to be made if strike operations were to be conducted against the Castro government. In the course of his eight page memorandum, Hawkins reiterated the need for resolution of the problem that had particularly bothered the Special Group that was wpether the Kennedy administration was interested in following through on the plans that had been made. Assuming that the Kennedy administration did intend to follow through on the program which had been initiated, Hawkins suggested that considering the rapid build up of Castro's military forces the strike operations be conducted not later than 1 March 1961. The ques- tion of air strikes was basic to Hawkins's planning -- on this he was quite firm. In discussing the general question of air operations Hawkins said: It is axiomatic in amphibious operations that control of air and sea in' the objec- tive area is absolutely required. The Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable of opposing our landing must be knocked out or neutralized before our amphibious shipping makes its final run in to the beach. If this is not done, we will be courting disaster. Then, by specific recommendations, Hawkins urged the fvllowing: 1. That the air preparation commence not later than dawn on D minus 1 Day. - 192 - -'rOP SELkE [