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~F SECRrT question of developments of the anti-castro program until late in the fall, following the election of 1960 and the defeat of Mr. Nixon. At that time ~I. Eisen- hower reinjected himself into the program and stimulated action to the point where some of CIA·s p1anners hoped that -- in addition to the propaganda program which was already underway -- paramilitary operations might be initiated. Apparently this was fearee by Castro, too, for in his famous TV broadcast on the Bay of Pigs he said: . When our country was in danger of direct aggression and mobilized itself. it waited for the [Kennedy] presidential inauguration thinking that this man [Kennedy] would do something different, because all in all, we didn't understand why a man who assumed the administration of the United States would want to bear the guilt of someone else's mistak~.* 1/ This was not to b~, however, for aside fro~ considerable emphasis on the propaganda activity, there ~cs only limited support for sabotage activities prior to the * Raul Roa, Castro's Foreign Minister charsec that in the Eisenhower administration Vice President Nixon and General C. P. Cabell, ADCr, were tt-.u of the most vigorous proponents of direct action, vith Cabell proposing air and naval protection fc~ th~ i~vcsion and, if necessary, use of US marines ~o h~lc L~e beachhead. ~/ - 293- ~r $ECIZE I