◆ SpookStack

TOP S/cRET the OAS, the UN, or with Cuba. Robertson did play down the likelihood of serious military intervention by Cuba because of the strength of the Brigade's Air Force, once it moved into Nicaragua. ~ The care with which Robertson was treading the line with Somoza is quite similar to the handling of the situation by Lou Napoli at the time of his visit to Nicaragua in mid-October of 1960. Napoli also avoided very carefully indicating that views that he expressed represented anything other than his own personal thoughts.* * However, in a conversation with a member of WH Division on 9 August 1972, Napoli stated that he had assured the Somozas that the United States would not back out once the Cuban operation started and, fur- ther, that if Castro retaliated either militarily or in the UN/OAS, Somoza could expect full support from the us. . When the interviewer questioned Napoli about the authority that he had for making such statements, the response was that he had this from Headquarters. He further stated that he did not worry concerning the authority that Headquarters had. 30/ For whatever reason, Robertson's role in the negotiations with Somoza apparently left a bad after taste with Napoli, for in this same interview in 1972 he was quite pointed in noting that it was he, rather than Robertson who had played the principal role in negotiations with the head of the Nicaraguan state. 31/ (footnote continued on following page)--