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reference to the specific question of "Would you say you [the JCS] had the responsibility to volunteer advice to the President and since he received no contrary advice he had the right to assume that all was well?" General White's relpponse was, "Ye.s, except that a number of things took place that I did not know about. I knew nothing about the cancellation 117/ of the ID-Day] air strikes." General White noted the impossibility of maintaining the deniability of the US role in an operation such as that which had taken place; and he stressed the point that any operation invo1vi~g sizable numbers of aircraft stood no chance of maintaining its covert nature. General White said that even though the JCS spent far less time studying the Zapata plan than it had spent studying the Trinidad plan, the basic question .was a change of location rather than any significant I change in the plan. Once again, the four members of the committee let this statement pass unchallenged, raising no questions concerning the change to a night landing, the movement of materiel across the beach, or multiple landing sites several miles apart at Zapata as compared to Trinidad. Prior to the appearance of General Decker, Chief of Staff of the US Army, the Cuban Study Group had a brief session with Colonel Germosen,* USAF, who was assigned to the Development iii' Pseudonurn 124