◆ SpookStack

would seem to have been appropriate--considering the committee's responsibility to inform the President about the reasons for the failure of the operation--to have indicated the dramatic revision between the CIA air plan which was evaluated in JCSM-57-6l and the air operations which were authorized from D-2 until the end of the action. As evaluated by the JCS in February 1961, the air plan called for a D-l air strike by 14 B-26s against the six air- fields containing all of Castro's potential combat aircraft, against three microwave communication centers, naval units, and interdiction targets. Reattack by the same number of aircraft was planned for the afternoon of D-l, the morning of D-Day, and the afternoon of D-Day. Each aircraft headed for the airfield targets was to carry 2-750 lb. napalm bombs, 16-220 lb. fragmentation bombs, and 2,400 rounds of .50 caliber machine gun ammunition for the a-gun nose. This was the maximum air effort of the original plan and, in addition, one of the aircraft intended for the strike against 11/ each of the six airfields would have an American pilot. Neither the Taylor Committee members nor Agency personnel who testified before the committee contrasted the impact of the cutback in the air plan on the outcome of the operation-- -particularly the restrictions on the number of planes, the use of napalm, and the targets that were imposed from D-2 through D-Day. If the operation was judged to have only a 188