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Dean Rusk notwithstanding. Arthur Schlesinger noted that when Kennedy believed that the cost of failure was reduced to an acceptable level, he said: "If we" have to get rid of the 800 men, it is much better to dump them in Cuba than in the United States, especially if that is where they want to go." 32/ d. On the point that the Cuban Expeditionary Force had achieved tactical surprise in its landing, the CSG was correct, but it reiterated the doubtful proposition discussed earlier in this paper that the Brigade "fought well and inflicted heavy casualities on the enemy." Another part of this same conclusion was that because of the short life of the invasion "Castro's repressive measures following the landing made coordinated uprising of the populace impossible," and there could be little argument about this. Actually, however, Castro's repressive measures were instituted almost immediatley following the D-2 air strike which he properly assessed as a precursor to larger scale military activities. e. The CSG also concluded that the President and his senior advisers had been confused about the guerrilla option being available to the Brigade if the situation at the beachhead should become too difficult. Robert Kennedy, of course, had been 213