◆ SpookStack

from the distance of Washington.•• " was undisputable. The questionable portion of the conclusion was whether there was a clear understanding in the Washington headquarters of the Agency and in the operations center in the Pentagon of the state of affairs at the beachhead. Memorandum No. 3 of the Taylor committee stated "This [lack of under- standing about the state of affairs at the beach- head] was particularly the case on the night of D+l when an appreciation of the ammunition situation would have resulted in an appeal for US air cover in an all-out effort to supply the beach by all available means." This suggests greater responsiveness and willingness to risk loss of deniability by the Kennedy administration than had been evidenced at any time earlier. In fact, the President's reluctance to grant more than one hour for the Navy CAP on the morning of D+2 would not seem to warrant a judgment that the President would have loosened the reins in favor of overt US support for the Brigade. 7. Another conclusion took up the issue of the JCS'ssupport of the Zapata plan, and mentioned that the JCS position in favor of Trinidad over Zapata--even though 216 I