◆ SpookStack

The evidence necessary to demonstrate that Clark's version of the CAP was self-convicting became available before the Taylor Committee closed its investigation, and it was un- fortunate that the Agency's USAF representatives--particularly Colonels Beerli and Germosen or Gar Teegen--had no opportunity to challenge Admiral Clark's testimony. As detailed in Appendix F to this volume, it is unimaginable that the B-26s could have come "over our ship one hour early" without having been picked up well in advance by the Essex's radar or by reconnaissance aircraft off the Essex which, considering the Navy's concern regarding a possible attack by Castro's B-26s, should have been aloft. The facts regarding the USN air CAP illustrates how CIA became the whipping boy for the failure of others at the Bay of Pigs.* Inasmuch as Gar Teegen, the commander for the air operations at the Nicaragua air base, had sent an emergency message to the commanding officer of the Essex pointing out that without assistance from the Navy jets on D+2, "[we] will be sitting ducks without your help--these are American boys," it w.as particularly disheartening to have to report the loss of two B-2Gs each carrying an American pilot and copilot.** * For Appendix F see page~. **The reason for concern over this incident sterns not from the possibility that the USN CAP would have prevented the collapse of the invasion but that it might have provided an opportunity for the anti-Castro brigade to have organized an orderly evacuation from the beachhead. In addition, it might have prevented the loss of American lives. 62 t '·r.~