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The escape clause in Mr. Bundy's statement, of course, was "the reference to "the President's advisers" because it is true that if this referred to the White House Staff none of the group, except Bundy himself, was likely to have been aware of the T-33 problem. There certainly was no question, however, that both Bundy's and the JCS's concern about removing Castro's Air Force automatically included the T-33s. Once again the reader is referred to the earlier comments concerning the appearance of General Cabell and Mr. Bissell with Secretary of State Rusk on the evening of 16 April 1961 when it was made quite clear that failure to take out the remaining air- craft in Castro's inventory on D-D~y as planned would lead to the destruction of the Cuban Expeditionary Force's shipping and and that this, in turn, equated to defeat of the brigade. Certainly every attempt had been made to emphasize to various of the President's advisers--beginning with the briefing of Secretary Rusk and other cabinet members on 22 January 1961--that dominance of the air over Cuba was an absolute necessity for the success of th.e. planned anti-Castro operation. Mr. Bundy also addressed himself to another of the most controversial issues that was raised during the Taylor investigation-- the position of the DOD on the Zapata plan. According to -Mr. Bundy: 69