◆ SpookStack

Once again it appears that two members of the Taylor Committee should have been able to respond to the comments of one of the witnesses. In this instance, presumably the Director of Central Intelligence (PCI} had received a copy of the. JCSM-l66-6·l--at least one of the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs was that the Secretary of Defense forward a copy of the memorandum to the DCI. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arleigh Burke, too, should have reviewed the memorandum if, in fact, he did not receive his . 62/ own copy. In another of the protective stances that he adopted in support of administration policy, Mr. Bundy stated: I do not concur in any judgment that this operation was "run from the White House." What happened was rather that as trouble began to develop after D-Day, the.re was steady pressure on the President ~or a relaxation of rules which had pre- viously been made, and in the light of changing circumstances some such re- laxations were authorized. Only in the case of the decision on Sunday with respect to the D-Day strike was there an operational modification that re- stricted, instead of enlarging, the authorizations to the CIA. 63/ In the context presented, Mr. Bundy's remarks made it appear - as if the cancellation of the D-Day strike was a relatively insignificant ~atter--in fact it unhinged the whole operation. Moreover, l-1r. Bundy ignored the significant actions between D-2 and D-Day when re-attack on Castro's air fields was rejected and s~gnificant modifications of the D-Day target 73 -flo'