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Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP81R00560R000100010010-0 BENTWATERS-LAKENHEATH SIGHTINGS MAP ‘ 3. At 2200Z another URE (No. 3 in map) was picked up about 30 mi. east of Bentwaters and tracked to a point about 25 mi. west of the sta- tion; the tracking period was about 16 sec. The radar operator estimated the apparent speed of this URE to be “in excess of 4000 mph” but the time and distance figures indicated a speed of roughly 12,000 mph. All the returns “appeared normal, ex- cept for the last, which was slightly weaker than the rest.” The radar operator indicated that the “[re- turn] disappeared . . . by rapidly moving out of the GCA radiation pattern.” No further UREs are mentioned in the Bluebook report on the Bentwaters incident; and considering the confusion prevailing in reported times in Bluebook re- ports and the similarity of the reported tracks and speeds, possibly this URE and No. 4, which insti- gated the phone call to Lakenheath, may in fact be the same. 4. According to the Bluebook re- port on the Lakenheath incident, the Bentwaters GCA radar, at 2255Z, picked up a URE 30 mi. east (of Bentwaters) moving to the west at an apparent speed of “2000 to 4000 mph.” In the map shown at right, the track of the URE appears identi- cal with No: 3 except for the vanish- ing point. This URE then “disap- peared on scope 2 mi. east of station _and immediately appeared on scope 3 mi. west of station . . . it disap- peared 30 mi. west of station on scope.” If the word “immediately” means that the URE was picked up on the same PPI sweep, after 180 deg. rotation from east to west, it would imply that the apparent motion covered 5 mi. in 1 sec, an inferred speed of some 18,000 mph. At this rate the URE would have covered the 60 mi. track in about 12 sec (6 PPI sweeps). As pointed out, this may have been URE No. 3 from the Bentwaters Bluebook report, which is estimated at 12,000 mph, although the reported times are different. At this point, someone at the Bentwaters GCA station called the Lakenheath RATCC station asking the night-watch supervisor there if he had any “4000-mph targets” on his scopes and describing the track of URE No. 4. The caller stated that the control tower at Bentwaters had reported seeing “‘a bright light pass- ing over the field from east to west 4000-ft ie Z Agorot. Ronge of = (Leeann Recs First Motion to Here (time unknown) o. Stationary H 5 35min) p-— 00s “ 10-15min ! l] 7 ‘Approximate Ya warenaeace RAF starion Iniercept Point 4 a2002 camarioce | @ Ss es 5552 ra 43, ‘ ' 6B SILA St '5 Lokenheoth UFO First -—e 7 Bh Picked Up H ~ O10: re) ame econ, ed Up Here + 2 rome eogsaist s 20 _ 35 ly “1 21302 rerio winds Direction © Vy 400 ww yy sion + ae A . seate: eat a ee ee en r rire 7 KILOMETERS. WE 2 pilot of. a C-47 aircraft flying over the station at 4000-ft altitude re- ported a “bright light streaked under his aircraft traveling east to west at terrific speed.” The Lakenheath watch supervisor, although admit- tedly skeptical of this report, “im- mediately had all controllers start scanning the radar scopes . . . using full MTI (moving target indicator) , which eliminated entirely all ground returns.” . Shortly after this search began, one of the controllers noticed a sta- tionary echo on the scopes at an indicated position 20-25 mi. SW of Lakenheath (No. 5 in map). Note the position of this initial contact on the map; it is almost directly in line with the path of UREs 3 and 4 from the Bentwaters report. Although the MTI should haye eliminated the Jess than 40-50 knots, the radar personnel could detect “no move- ment at all” from this URE. The watch supervisor called the GCA unit at Lakenheath to see if they had the same echo on their scope and “they confirmed the target was on their scope in the same location.” As the Lakenheath RATCC personnel watched this URE, it suddenly began roving in a NNE direction at a speed that they subsequently calcu- lated to be 400-600 mph. In their words “there was no . .,. build-up to this speed—it was constant from the second it started to move until it stopped.” The watch supervisor contacted local AFB command personnel and kept them informed of the happen- ings from this point on. The URE made several changes in direction al tific, speed , at. ab 2 AB DKaNeR ROR RelRase 20040402 anG AeRDPBtROOSGORD00 100010070-0%%9s «t 61 September 1971