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Adrian Lamo — Part 1
Page 151
151 / 444
“To: i © From: New York b3 -2
Re: 8/07/2003 7
bI7E -3
2001, LAMO contacted the reportex,[__]
ko inform him that he had gained
unauthorized access into a MICROSOFT customer service database.
LAMO had gained access to MICROSOFT's database is September 2001
but choose not to disclose his access until October 2001. LAMO
utilized a vulnerability in MICROSOFT's network that allowed an
unpublished Internet Protocol (IP) address to be entered into a b6 -5
web browser. The IP address provided access to records of the bic -5
individuals who had purchased products and services from
MICROSOFT. The first notification of this unauthorized intrusion
was conducted by| who contacted MICROSOFT asking them for a
comment to his story he was writing regarding the hack.
MICROSOFT confixmed the hack anf
| described the incident as “an error that toa
reach Of privacy, against our privacy policy".
LAMO contacted the reporter,
to inform him that he had gained
unauthorized access into MCI WORLDCOM's internal network. LAMO
gained access to WORLDCOM's internal network in October 2001 but
choose not to disclose his access until December 2001. LAMO
provided internal screen captures to WORLDCOM to prove he was the pg -5
hacker. The screen captures from WORLDCOM's internal network bIC —5
state, "Not to be reproduced in any manner or disclosed to
unauthorized individuals". AMO gained access to WORLDCOM's
internal network using a free internet connection at KINKOS.
LAMO exploited a vulnerability in a WORLDCOM proxy server to gain
unauthorized access to their network. After committing the hack
and reporting it cols LAMO commented "The downside is, I'm
running out of major US Corporations". Also, one of LAMO's
prized possessions is a screen capture of WORLDCOM's stock price
falling after he announced he had hacked the company.
In February 2002, LAMO contacted the reporter,[ sd
to inform him that he had gained
unauthorized access into SBC COMMUNICATIONS, LAMO gained access 56 -5
to SBC COMMUNICATIONS network in December 2001 but choose not to b7c -5
disclose his access until February 2002. LAMO utilized an ~
exploit to gain access to SBC's internal network. LAMO used a
free internet connection at KINKO's to perform the hack. LAMO
gained access to usernames, passwords, telephone numbers,
addresses and other sensitive customer information.
In February 2002, LAMO discovered several misconfigured - og
proxy servers acting as doorways between the public Internet and be -5
the NEW YORK TIMES private intranet. LAMO contactea[ __] of b7c -5
ee inform him that he had gained unauthorized
access into The NEW YORK TIMES intranet. LAMO utilized the proxy
servers to gain access to the NEW YORK TIMES network. Once on
FBI(19-cv-1495)-204
aS |
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