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Adrian Lamo — Part 1
Page 90
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@ b3 -2 .
“To: New York From: New York
Re: [__] 07/29/2003 bTE ~3
In 2001, LAMO contacted the reporter, _]
to inform him that he had gained
unauthorized access into a MICROSOFT customer service database.
LAMO had gained access to MICROSOFT's database is September 2001 .
but choose not to disclose his access until October 2001. LAMO b6é —-5
utilized a vulnerability in MICROSOFT's network that allowed an b7C -5
unpublished Internet Protocol (IP) address to be entered into a
web browser. The IP address provided access to recor: of people
who had bought products and services from MICROSOFT.
contacted MICROSOFT to ask them for a comment for the story he
was writing about the hack. This was the first instance,
MICROSOFT learned of pal R T confirmed the hack
incident as "an error that led to a breach of privacy, against ‘
our privacy policy".
LAMO contacted the reporter,L____]
to inform him that he had gained
unauthorized access into MCI WORLDCOM's internal network. LAMO
gained access to WORLDCOM's internal network in October 2001 but
choose not to disclose his access until December 2001. LAMO bb -5
provided internal screen captures to WORLDCOM to prove he was the ~
hacker. The screen captures from WORLDCOM's internal network bic -5
state, "Not to be reproduced in any manner or disclosed to
unauthorized individuals". LAMO gained access to WORLDCOM's
internal network using a free internet connection at KINKOS.
LAMO exploited a vulnerability in a WORLDCOM proxy server to gain
unauthorized acc ir network. After committing the hack
and reporting it LAMO commented "The downside is, I'm
running, out of major US Corporations". Also, one of LAMO's
prized possessions is a screen capture of WORLDCOM's stock price
falling after he announced he had hacked the company.
2002, LAMO contacted the reporter, |
Cc ary 2 inform him that he had gained
unauthorized access into SBC COMMUNICATIONS. LAMO gained access
to SBC COMMUNICATIONS network in December 2001 but choose not to b6
disclose his access until February 2002. LAMO utilized an «
exploit to gain access to SBC's internal network. LAMO used a bIC -S
free internet connection at KINKO's to perform the hack. LAMO
gained access to usernames, passwords, telephone numbers,
addresses and other sensitive customer information.
-5
In February 2002, LAMO discovered several misconfigured
proxy servers acting as doorways between the public Internet and
private intranet. LAMO contacted Leet
o inform him that he had gained unauthorized
access into The NEW YORK TIMES intranet. LAMO utilized the proxy
servers to gain access to the NEW YORK TIMES network. Once on
2
FBI(19-cv-1495)-127
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