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Far Eastern depart he charges were full: sciplinaty board; sk. There hi aving beea gui i s decided to 4} n fora a Of j'prottacied tavestigations into the possibility en By of he was promoted, That vained, a3 he had bee! ent, a member of th junior branch of the 3urgess. wan a feilure.| Philby, temporary First Secretary to reported untavouradl orking in that depart- | ties -in “the United s “might ea made that during a | coveredLooking ba. they wondered {¢ \, late in 1949, he ad | this led to his breakdown in Caita in 2950, sus indiscretion about Although the circumstances“of the “Ols- he | tip-off, it was quite possible that Maclean inded; and informed | fed with Burgess because one or other insfetred and that his | noticed circumstances or a combination of omotion’ ‘would be | circumstances which aroused their 1980 might have warnf “im thar his a1 ly | appearance were explainable in terms of @ picions. The possibility of a tip-off had to seriously considered, and searching and ad heen undertaken and were now proceeding. . MR. H. A. R, PHILBY ¢| The name of one man had been men- tioned in the House, but not outside, in this connexion. He was Mr. H. A. R. ly | British’ Embassy in Washington from Qcto- : ‘work and behaviour | ber, 1949, to June, 1981, who had been y. 1981, four years after i and nine months after pity to tuch of the investigation of the leakage. He had been friends with Burgess 1) Washington, he was | from their time as fellow undergraduates onelusion reached that | in Trinity College, Cambridge, and Burgess leave the service. Unt i) | was accommodated at his home in Washing: t sappearance there were | ton from August, 1950, to Aprit, 1951, ect that he was workin; y of the State. He ha it then indiscretion was haracteristic of a secret | associations before and after his university would be realized that at no time before he ficd was Burgess under suspicion. It hi been found that Mr. Philby had Communist and he was asked in 195! to resign * di ation a further point, in i tion a further point, it | from the Foreign OR ye subi Unister, -« Privy Coon, se aia evidence had been ted that he had warned | found that he was responsible for warming it Burgess when be be- | Burgess and Maclean, While. in Govern- assistant. He (Mr. Mace | ment service he carried out his duties ably orry about the timing of | and conscientiously. There was no Teason elation. (Hear, heat STIGATED FOR EVIDENCE had said enough to show | 82Y ev! 4% not irve that the two ed by senior officials. 149, & report was received sh information had become set auth a8 no indication of how it lable. Jeak might_not from British sources. Dili- cre begun immediately, bi sibilities to be covered wi to conclude tha: he had, at any time, betrayed the interests of Britain, of 10 TO RUSSIA identify him with the so-called third man, if there was one. As regard others whose names had been associated with the affair, he hod caused them to. be carefully studied and investi; gatcd. No one was being shielded. Had idence of guilt been forthcoming he or his predecessors, would not have hesitated to have taken appropriate action. No such evidence had been found, ‘A number of Foreign Service officers who had been either office colleagues or had iti a few rs bs i ies a few years | er ociaied ouside with Burgess were exam- ined but nothing had been found. if anyone inside or outside the House could produce evidence he trusted it would be made avail- able to the authorities. MR. HERBERT MORRISON (Lewi- ut as nce came gradually to light, | sham, South, Lab.).—It is said in a News- Whe credit of the security | paper that Mc, Philby and his family have the circumstance that infor- | disanpeared. Does the Minister regard. that sked to the Soviet Governs { a5 significant in the circumstances of the nawn at ali—he could not } caso >. but it was an almost in- MR. MACMILLAN. have no reason _skill~and, given the magni- | ta think they have Jeft this country. 1 the breadth of the possible | think it is very improbable. paucity of the informati at the field was graduall vin the course of two years, { eft she must and that the right one he suspicion narrowed down | afier, he left. Whether she remained _in- the evidence was both a circumstantial. The best, | could do no good in this country and iy, chance of obtaining evi- | Lite harm abroad. vould be used to support a lay in.abcaining admissions CLOSER SCRUTINY | it there was no firm start interview. It was. highly and activities which could asis. for questiofiiqg him, ws therefore put onehim. The to watch him at his home at deliberately taken, after a care. | 1945 a check had regularly been made on (G been made of the technical } all new entrants into the Foreign Service olved in keeping him vn in the neighbourhood of iP ctucion was that the risk that | adverse security record was held agains! put on his guard would be CIRIES CONTINUING se of Fuchs, the security service | the negative check: Tue exactly the same risk and } persons who had already come, to the un- stified in the result, 1 of the watch on Macl Co tanne—e contact oF some: dc- ain-furher information about ion | Mrs, Maclean had been of fittle import ly | ance. Anything she knew before Maclean ane ve must have got from him, and she fad no means. of oblaining information ine | Britain or left made tittle, dificrence. She ing 10% OFFICIALS. MOVED “+ s-~: pe | ‘The next question was what steps were taken te ancure that there should be no repetition of such a deplorable story. Since der | and on all new temporary employees. his | That check was made 10 ensure that mo toa | candidates for employment. Since 1945 alt officers already employed had been so checked, but it was acknowledged that that check was not adequate—what was called ce it only revealed Rvourable notice of the security authori« lean | tics. When applied to Maclean aod Bur- | gesé it revealed nothing about the subversive LievegSwaunns ont their early days.