◆ SpookStack

iy rouyhed ‘out a@ report which 1 ‘would present to the Chief, des- ‘ertbing in detail the fallure of my mission. Necessarily, it contained my theory of Volkov's se Was dead. disappearance. The essence ot as to clinch the ; the theory was that Volkov's mly to make my | own insistence on bag communi- lef look better. ; cations brought about his ¥ . downfall. Nearly three weeks had elapsed since his first approach to Page Y before we first tried to contact asked” Page to y him During that time the Gesperate effort, ; Russians had ample chances of 1 galling. ‘a oie Getting on to him. and, %:; Doubtless both his office and rson ? {his living quarters were bugged. {Both he and his wife were {efeported to be nervous, Then ‘y of scuffle and « hpe went dead.” ils, 1 was pretty knew what had Li OF course, 1 ‘admitted, this was all speculation; the truth .- by might never be known Another theory=that the Russiane had been Wi; ped of J about Volkou's appri Bean 1. it it Suppo! ; was. no worth Trelading in’ my report, ad 7 solid toldenoe ' No part Volkov Incident as desceined” "by Ebilby has been though ihe Fereign Office and M.LS obtained coples of the memoirs weeks Bxo. So it seems to qualil as the worst-known example of bungling ineptitude over security, lcularly by both branches of the Foreign Office—the diplomatic staff and the Secret Intelligence Service. There are two features of the case which suggest that Philby has not been allowed by. his Ruslan masterg. the whole story i— a If Volko knew ‘there was a . Russian ° apy in” a ” Qounterveapienage ndo} -4n Istanbul instead & Secondly, Philby makes it clear that on the drst night the news of Volkov reached London he contacted his Soviet spy- master, who must have Immedi- ately alerted the : Intelligence Centre in Moscow. With such information, the centre would ae contact the Soviet rmbassy) In | Istanbol and Britain's leading commentator on security affalrs spinning out the time before his attempt to see Volkov? ‘The reaction of the British diplomats to Philby's arrival is pical of the friction between te dipfomatic and esplonage branches of the Foreign Office. But dealing with a defector from what was then an ally— the incident happened In 1945— was a touchy business. ‘ ko “1 do believe Philby's ¢laim that be became “an accredited member of the Soviet Intelligence Service” in ‘bis early twenties. Nor do any of the secarity officials with whom {have «discussed. Philby's career. The Russian Intelligence Ses- vice does not operate that way. I¢ is much more Itkely that Philby was recrulted by a» Brillsh Communist talent-scout as ® potential agent when be was at Cambridge Calyersity or soon after ‘ds. But, his was then called, Is un have happened until joined the British Secre re Servico—also kr Philby confirms _ official “bellet that penetrate the Secret Tn Service” ag the resul deliberate long-term pi was pure chance that was Inviled to join M. being a foreign nv correspondent—a comm of entry during the wa: The most revealing ton is Philby’s statem he met his Russian spy in the “remoter open + London.” These we donbtedly men pox Boviet Embassy ‘diplom: Case after caso has that If every Rt: “diplomat” were shad their British counterpar Moscow—they would e Tead to almost every sp country, But M.L5—the espionage servico—cant because the Sovlet Erb: Is so big. There are 7 current Longon Diplo. M.L5 had repeated! the ‘Government to Ii number of Russian dip) Brifain but Foreien OM