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KIM PHILBY’S SILENT WAR conunued relevant Foreign Office list left me in little doubt about the identity of the source in the British Embassy: A careful study of the files did something to allay my immediate fears [for the source's safety]. As SIS was not supposed to operate inside the U.S.. investigation of the leakages was in the hands of the FBI. Characteristically, they had put in an immense amount of work resulting n an im mense amount of waste paper. It had so far occurred neither to them nor to the British that a diplomat was involved, let alone a fairly senior diplomat. Instead. the investigation had concentrated on non-diplomatic employees of the embassy, and particularly on those locally recruited: the sweepers, cleaners. botile-washers and the rest A charlady with a Lat vian grandmother, for instance, would rate a 15-page report crowded with insignificant detail of herself, her family and friends. he: private life and holiday habins, lt was testimony to the enormous sesources of the FBI, and to the pitiful extent to which those resources were squandered. It was enough to convince me that urgent action would not be necessary, but that the case would require minute watching medbately after entering American territorial waters. An FBI Tepresentative had come out in the pilot's launch to greet me. J gave him a gtass of To Pepe which he sipped unhappily while we made polite conversation. 1 was Tater to Jearn thay the men of the FBJ, with hardiy an exception, were proud of their insularity. of having sprung from the grass roots. One of the first senior G-men J met in Washington claimed to have had # grandpappy who kept a general store at Horse Creek. Mossourr They were. therefore, whisky-drinkers, with beer jor light refreshment By contrast. CIA men flaunted cos- mopolitan postures. They would disduss absinthe and serve Burgundy above room temperature. This is not just flippancy Tt points to a deep social cleavage between the two organiza- bons, which accounts for at least some of the rift between them In Washington, my predecessor. Peter Dwyer?. met me and explained. over our first Bourbon, that his resignation had nothing to do with my appointment to succeed him. For personal reasons, he had long wanted to settle in Canada, where a congenial government post was awaiting bim. The news of my posting to Washington had simpy determined the timing of his northward move to Ottawa So we started on a pleasant footing. Nothing could exceed the care and astute- ness with which he inducted me into Washington politics Jt is not easy to make @ coherent pictuse of my tour of duty in the United States It was too varied, and often too 2 Now wsunate director of the Canad Council in Ottawa The Casadian posernmen! apparentis never did set up a secret gervice as auch Internal wesurry and coamler-espionage ave handied by the RCMP Aran, 196% amorphous, to be reduced to simple terms. Liaison with the FB) alone, if 1 had been conducted thoroughly, would have been a full-time job. It was the era of McCarthy in full, evil Dlast. I was also the era of Hiss. Coplon, Fuchs. Gold. Greenglass and the brave Rosenbergs — not to mention others who are still nameless. Liaison with CIA covered an even wider field, ranging from a serious attempt to subvert an East European regime to such questions as the proper exploitation of German secret documents. In every question that arose, the first question was 10 please one party without offending the other, In addition. I had 10 work with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and with individuals in the Department of External Affairs who were dickering with the idea of setting up an independent Canadian secret service’. Where to begin” As the end of my story chiefly concerns the FBI, ] should perhaps concede to CIA the beginning. The head of the organization when I arrived was Admiral Hillen- koetter. an amiable sailor who was soon to give way to Gen- era} Bedell Smith without leaving much of a mark on Ameri- can intelligence history. The two divisions with which I had most to do were the Office of Strategic Operations (OSQ) and the Office of Policy Co-ordination (OPC). In plain English, OSO was the intelligence-gathering division and OPC was charged with subversion The driving force of OSO at the time was Jim Angleton, who had formerly served in London and had earned my respect by openly rejecting the Anglomania that disfigured the young face of OSO. Although our discussions ranged over the whole world. they usually ended, if they did not begin. with France and Germany. The Americans had an obsessive fear of Com- munism in France. and 1 was astonished by the way in which Angleton devoured reams of French newspaper material daily. That this was not a private phobia of Angleton’s became clear at a later date when a British proposal for giving French intelligence services mited secret information was firmly squashed by Bedell Smith in person. He told me flatly that he was not prepared to trust a single French official with such information Germany. That country concerned him chiefly as a base of operations against the Soviet Union and the socialist states of Eastern Europe. CIA had lost no time in taking over the anti-Soviet section of the German Abwehr [part of Hitier's secret service). under Von Gehien, and Angleton often de- fended, with chapter and verse, the past record and current activities of the Von Gehien organizations. Secret activity of al) kinds. including operations directed against the German authorities themselves, wese financed by the Germans, as part of the payment for the expenses of occupation. Apari from Angleton, my / continued on page 74 7