◆ SpookStack

* Former Foreign Office There was much discussion as to his 1497 future post. It was desirable to send him to a post where his general suitability for the Foreign Service could be properly tested. It was, therefore, decided to sen: him to Washington for a period of trial on routine work. - There have been suggestions “that, i having been guilty of serious indiscre- tions, he was promoted. That is not so. He remained, 2s he had been since his establishment, a member of the fourth 1 grade of the junior branch of the Ser- j vice. In Washington, Burgess was a failure. The Ambassador reported un- favourably both upon his office work and { upon his behaviour outside, and in May, } 19St, four years after his establishment ‘and nine months after his appointment at Washington, he was recalled, and the conclusion was reached that he would have to leave the service, Until the day , of Burgess's disappearance there were no rounds for suspecting that he was work- ing against the security of the State. ? He had been indiscreet, but, then, indis- erction is not generally the characteristic _ Of a@ sceret agent. Thcre is one further point that I think, in fairness to the late Mr. McNeil ought to mention. J observe that a former Minister and Privy Councillor recently stated that he had warned McNeil about Burgess when he became his personal assistant. I am bound to say that I feel very sorry about the timing of this particular sevelation. So much for the official careers of the two men. I think that I bave said enough to show that it simply is not isue that they were protected by senior officials. It may be argued that their superiors ought to have kaown more about them, and I shall have something to say later sbout the subsequent improvements in the Foreign Office system of reports on the staf. - “"Tmust now dea the other ques- tions which I posed about the escape of the two men, the competence the measures taken to keep Maclean under observation and how he got warning of ft. To understand the problem, J must “first say something of the background. It was in January, 1949—a very im-* } be put on his guard would be too great. portant date—that a report was received that certain British information had become available to the Soviet authoriti ucs wee ee | no 7] NOVEMBER 1955 at / -country to conceal from a man the fact ” Eat ee cee oe al Saeed ett nee dieters eten aesean penne et Officials Disappearance 1498 a few years earlier.” However, there’ was No indication a6 to how it had become available. The feak might not even ha’ been from British sources. a oe i Diligent inquiries were begun imme * diately, but the field of possibilities to be covered was very large. Further evidence . ee 4 nee which was not available when the investigation began—gradually came to - . Tight, and it is, in fact. greatly to the 5. credit of the security authorities that the circumstance in which that information had Yeaked to the Soviet Government became known at all. I cannot give the -- - details, but it was an almost incredible act of skill that, given the magnitude of the task, how broad the possible field was and the paucity of the information available, the ficld was gradually narrowed down in the course of two years to one suspect, and that the right one. The House will not expect me to give © full details of the investigations, but 1 ~~ hope that it will accept my assurai that they were pursved with diligence and efficiency. But, even when suspicion narrowed down to Maclean, the evidence was both inconclusive and circumstantial, The best, perhaps the only, chance of obtaining evidence which could be used to support a prosecution Tay in obtaining admissions from him. But there was no firm starting point for an interview with him. It was highly desirable to obtain furtber information about his contacts’ ~~’ and activities which could be used as reason for questioning him../ sen coh. sen "A _watch was, therefore, put upon hit Yor the primary purpose—indced, the sole purpose—of securing such information. ~ As was said in the White Paper, every- thing depended upon the interview, and “its success depended also on the use of an elemeat of surprise. If he were alerted to the fact that he was under investigation of suspected it, all hope of obtaining the essential confirmat evidence, would. probably have gone for good. . For that reason, the decision not to ~~ watch him at Tatsfield was deliberately “taken after a careful survey had been made of the technical problems invoived - in keeping him under observation in the neighbourhood of his home. The con- clusion was that the risk that he would Obviously, it is far more difficult in the 24 Cat Se emer aerate ome .