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err eee 2" Office » [Mm Macmitean) <27 6. odes ot country or Seft made little difference. She could do no particular good in England ; she could do no particular barm abroad. Again, the over-riding fact semains that there is no power under the law of England to prevent her from leaving this counuy.- ae OR ge Hon. Members will ask what fessons have been learned and what steps have been taken-~hat really is the vital point —-to {sy to ensure that there can be no repetition of such a deplorable story. This leads me to the question of security checks. Since 1945, a check has regularly been made on all new entrants into the Foreign Office and all new temporary employees. This check is made to ensure that no adverse security record is held against candidates for employment. Since 1945, all officers already em- ployed have been so checked, but it is acknowledged that this check is not ade- quate—what is called the negative check ~since it will only reveal persons who have already come to the notice—un- favourable notice, if you like—of the security authorities. “Indeed. when applied to Maclean and Burgess, it re- vealed nothing about the subversive political associations of their early days. ‘tom 1951 onwards, it was recognised that more must be done to check the reliability of persons holding important Positions in the public service, __ 1 At the beginning of 1952, a regular system of positive vetting was introduced, This procedure entails detailed research into the whole background of the officer ee eeerraars conceracd, including his school and uni- . versity career and any previous employ- ment before joining the Foreign Service. In a large number of cases, personal in- quiries are made of university tutors, past employers and others who have personal knowledge of the candidate. Since 1952, about cases, involving tbe senior, junior and clerical branches of the ‘orcign Service, have been examined. So far, there have been four cases in the Foreign Service in which an officer’s poli- tical activities and associations have led to his feaving the Service altogether. In about half-a-dozen other cases it has been considered prodent to move officers to other work of tess importance to the national security, or to accept their Fesignations, je, tet This positive vetting procedure is not confined to the Foreign Service. Ut is 7 NOVEMBER 1955 -sidility of bis public dut}, or to expowe Cs now ted in al! Government Depart, ments having access to classified material: involving the security of the State. Imme- 7 diately after the disappearance of ry and Burgess, the right hon. Gentleman the; Member for Lewisham, South, who wast then Foreign clary, set Up a@ com mittee to look into aff aspects of the’, security arrangements in the Forcige « Service. The committee was an | one, and it may perhaps be criticised om J that account, but 7 think that it was a} wise act of the right hon. Gentleman, who | chose officials singularly well suited to + their ¢ask—men with great records of? devotion to the public service, The com! mittce was presided over by Sir Alexander | Cadogan, and Sit Nevile Bland and Sir z Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet. } were the other members” ‘The commitice reported in November, | 1951, approving the security check, in- cluding the plans for positive vetting ~ which had already been prepared. : recommended that vetting should be, extended 1o all members of the senior |; branches and the senior grades of the funior branches of the Foreign Service. In fact, the present practice of the - Forcign Service goes beyond that recom- - mendation, since many more jusior * grades, which must inevitably be om- Z ployed on highly classified work, are ‘ positively vetted. The committee con- « sidered not only political unreliability ia 4 itself, but the problem of character ~ defects, which might lay an officer open ¥ to blackmail, of otherwise undermine his loyalty and sense of responsibility. Shortly afier the disappearance “ of Maclean and Burgess, and before the Cadogan Committee reported, fresh in- structions had been issued by the Perma- nent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office to heads of missions and other senior officials impressing upon them the need to watch in particular the forms of behaviour among their staff likely to sap an officer’s discretion or sense of respan- 4 ? % rhs ee eh Nabe him to undue influence or blackmail to heighten in undue measure the tension § of his existence. committee com _¢ mented on these instructions with - approval and emphasised that not only * the heads of missions but some junio ~< officers in charge of sections throughout the Foreign Service, and, indeed, in other services, ought to be reminded of their