Reader Ad Slot
Reader Ad Slot placeholder
If you would like to support SpookStack without paying out of pocket, please consider allowing advertising cookies. It helps cover hosting costs and keeps the archive free to browse. You can change this choice at any time.
Cambridge Five Spy Ring — Part 37
Page 33
33 / 47
TY ple thnonte macteaial
op
‘
“Pye
i ote cant te it hee aietoaee te eae
Ca
“4Sis “Former Ge Office
(Mr, Morrison] -77- 77 -
way. If we were to take it as conclusive
that because a man was a Communist
“of a Fascist in his university life, he must,
therefore, be permanently held under sus-
ficicn, as likely to betray secrets of State,
think that we should be degenerating
into McCarthyism, because that was
exactly what McCarthyism was—a_prob-
ing back and the assumption that if there
had been such a relationship the man
must be held to be guilty. - > --- -
The dates of ali these incidents are
revealed in the White Paper, and five
Governments in al! were involved—the
pre-war Conservative Government, the
Coalition Government, two Labour Gov-
“"9 NOVEMBER igs” “oni Niss ,
will think that anybody ta the hight’
reaches of the Foreign Office who wer
responsible ia this matter would for ot
moment have sought to protect any ¢
their colleagues from a charge c
espionage. am quite sure that the
would not, and that wi be an unju:
suspicion, 0° 9 fr tgN oe ee,
At a later date, as outlined Ja th
White Paper, Maclean became the prin
cipal suspect, and as a consequence som
top-secret papers were withheld from him
at was a decision which, no doubi
occasioned some difficulty because i
might arouse suspicion, On the otha
‘band, if the papers had continued to &
supplied to him, it would have faid th:
ernments and the present Government. authorities open to great criticism in du
Therefore. we are all in it. Five Gov- course if trouble arose. In all thes
ernments have been concerned with these matiers we have to remember ths
two men, and J feel that we must all dilemma of the security authorities. Apan
do our best to help the House, but we from the small security branch of th:
must have due regard to security in the Foreign Office, the wider security authort
rocess. I will tell the House what I ties, of course, were responsible to th:
know about this matter during the short Prime Minister and not to the depart:
period that J held office as Secretary of mental Ministers, which is quite right.
State for Foreign Affair. -; -- -- | The evidence against these men at the
So far as I can recall, I never met , material times right up to their departure
Mr, Burgess. I met Mr. Maclean only ; was insuMficieat 4o warrant decisive action
once, and that was at a social gathering. | on charges of espionage. If they had
which bears out the point that his office "been arrested and ultimately found in-
as Head of the American Department was nocent, that would have brought discredit
not of the kind which would bring him
into frequent contact with the Secretary
of State. 1 will teli what T know. As
I say, five Governments were involved,
as well as a number of Ministers at the
Foreign Office. Unfortunately, two of the
Ministers who were at the Foreign Office
during part of the time—Mr. Bevin and
Mr. McNeil—have died. Nothing J shall
say should be taken as criticism of them
—ihey are not here to answer for them-
selves—but I may have to refer to
matters which occurred during heir
period of ol we camrcnne men wae
both on the Foreign Office and the
Security Service, and charges of goodness
kaows what would have been made. The
evidence was insufficient. It could not
justify arrest, and further evidence was
needed in order to justify effective action.
There was another reason why precipi-
tate action could not very well be taken.
That was that one of the most valuable
things to do in counter-espionage is no
only to find out the mao or the men whe
are responsible for espionage but to find
out their contacts and the channel:
through which they act and from whom
I will tell the story of my own part in! they receive their orders. Therefore, pre
this matter. In the middle of April, 1951, -cipitate action might destroy the wide
1 was verbally informed, in general terms, “operation gf unravelling the network o
of leakages that | had occurred. it that ¢spionage against our country... >.
time, it was still not known who were . Cold mw ch te
the informants, although suspicion rity. Daines + Gould Pek eee
narrowed down to a quite limited number (35 explain why the ports were 00
of people. To the best of my recollection ( sterted in case Maclean went: and
ithe names were not mentioned to me. secondly, could my right hon. Frient
The Security Service arranged to! explain why Maclean's passpori was oc
investigate, and it sought and obtained withdrawn? May I draw my right hor
full Foreign Office co-operation. I hope’ Friend's attention to the fact that pas:
that po one bere or outside the House] ports have been withheld from Britis
nes 2
Community corrections
No user corrections yet.
Comments
No comments on this document yet.
Bottom Reader Ad Slot
Bottom Reader Ad Slot placeholder
If you would like to support SpookStack without paying out of pocket, please consider allowing advertising cookies. It helps cover hosting costs and keeps the archive free to browse. You can change this choice at any time.
Continue Exploring
Agency Collection
Explore This Archive Cluster
Broad Topic Hub
Topic Hub
federal bureau
Related subtopics
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic