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| 4 is73 i only by giving them money. not only by threatening them, not only“by any of the ! old-established ways, but by appealing to : their ideology. It is very true indeed. f What I contend, what has been suggested by many hon, Members in the debate, and $ what is certainly suggested in the White , Paper, is that since the war, at any rate, our security service haus been going the wrong way about it 10 detect those people. This particular failure by the security service in the case of Burgess and Maclean is bad enough in itself, but I maintain that it cannot be considered in ag eR ROE RR AEE IR SN ety of a series of failures, which were far more damaging to the safety of this country than this one, .I refer to the cases of the three Russian agents engaged on atomic research in this country, that is to say. Dr. Alan Nunn May in 1946, Dr. { Fuchs in 1949, and Professor Pontecorvo {in 1950. T hope that the House will bear with me for a few minutes while I say & few words about each of them, for that Jeads to the point 1 am anxious to make. The first of these three agents and traitors, the Teast considerable and the least harmful. was Alan Nuon May. At y Cambridge he was definitely recognised ia asa Communist. When he left there he went to Russia op a visit, and when he came back he joined the editorial board of the “Scientific Worker.” which is the official journal of the National Associa- tion of Scientific Workers, and which at that time, I think it would be quite fair to say, included many Communists amongst its directors. = © 7 teil St { am not suggesting that for these reasons Nuno May should not have been : employed -on atomic research in this 4 country. Aftereall, in those days, in the : “thirties, it was not so very uncommon : to have those views when one was an undergraduate. - What ‘is more, when Nuno May was engaged by Tube Alloys,’ the cover name used for atomic research in those days, any person who was a strong pro-Russian was considered also to be a strong anti-Hitler. When, however, after the war ous actua} enemy, Germany, changed to potential enemy, Russia, men like that in such vital positions should have been considered by our security ser- vices not, perhaps, with suspicion but, at_ asy rate, with a very inquiring eye.~. 2: ~* -1 do pot think that too much blame can be attached in the first case, but the ne soot es ae secs hae ban rete Se en ge ee. Se “Former Foreign Office “S NOVEMBER 1955 Officials “Disappearance S16 - isolation. As I sce it, it is the culmination. eee point is that, as a result, our Services apparently made no sort of inquiries sbout the antecedents and back? ground of other atomic scientists who were working for us. If they had done fo, they would bave found a very much. more important man, Dr. Klaus Fuchs? > They would have found ‘thal he was. @, refugee in this country from Nazi perse- cution in Germany in his youth, that he - had been a member of the Communist . Party all his adult life, that all bis -~ brothers and sisters were Communists; . that he had been seported to the Chief Constable of Bristol as a Communist, and that his name had been found in the : note-book of one of the chief suspects ~ in the Canada spy trial. Yet, apparently, - none of these facts was discovered by: our security services, and it was only - three years later, when word came from: America, that we were able to get busy on him. One would have thought that: after that, at least, our security fice’ would have been alerted in this kind case, but not a bit of it,>+ *; - We then come to the worst cases, that of Professor Pontecorvo which! followed very soon afterwards. Professo¢ Bruno Pontecorvo, like Fuchs, was in, his youth a victim of Fascist persecution, ~ = this time jn Italy. He bad a brother there ~~~ who was a well-known and active Com: _ munist. He had a sister who was masried- to a professed Communist, and his first cousin was a member of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist’ s2° Party, After those two earlier examples, it was nothing short of shameful that oar’ security services knew nothing at all about: thi a eas ek VES * After Pontecorvo had escaped. Questions were raised in the House, th were the kind of replies that were give pie October, 1950, in Sante * a supplementary question my how Frend the Member for Altrincham and “~*~ Sale (Mr. Erroll), the then Minister of - > _ Varna (fe. GR Sau) tad tok ‘auxhal . le aUSss) 62 . om Pontecotvo <---2 2 ac =... bas been screened several Gmes during the last few yeare by our security officern”. 4 - “In answer to a further question, the ~ sight bon. Gentleman said “... according to the security screenings were particularly sat [OrFicaL Report, 23rd October,