◆ SpookStack

& . Cy been apprized by Bern, were waiting for thea, and sent them to Moscow. The trip gzigragged, but was without snags: not a single agent from the MI5 (English Counterespionage Service) was able to intercept then. . When he learned of the two men's flight, the American Secretary of State at the time, Dean Acheson, who only knew MacLean, let slip this remark which he refuted 24 hours later: “My Heavens, but he knew everything?” __ 1. Yes, MacLean knew everything. He and Burgess took a package containing atomic, military, chemical and, most importantly, political information with then. + 2. Their experience in the Foreign Service allowed them to describe to the Russians the methods, people, customs, and keys to the Anglo-Saxon diplomatic system in its entirety. 3. During the first five years of their exile in Moscow, they were regularly consulted on what should be thought about a certain decision, nomination, declaration, conference among the Allies, etc.... : Moreover, uone of the officials wanted to reveal what Burgess's and MacLean's "leaks" were while they were in the Foreign Service. But, this was discovered: during the worst stage of the “cold war,” the U. 8. A. and Kngland were sending daily confidentia messages; Burgess was at Washington, and MacLean at London; at the two ends of the confidential wire. They therefore had access to everything, and it .is probable that the Russians did not need listening devices; Burgess and MacLean sufficed. An even more serious accusation was launched by several American Senatorg: When the Korean War was in full swing, the Russians and the Chinese needed to know whether the U. 8S. A. had decided to "cross the Yalu"; that is to say, whether they had decided to carry the war to the other side of North Korea into Manchuria. This problem was the subject of fuequent consultations between the U. 8. A. and Great Britain. Finally, Truman decided that the Yalu would not be crossed (which also obligated him to remove General MacArthur, who was against this decision). Burgess and MacLean communicated this capital decision to the East. This allowed the Chinese to amass troops on the other side of the Yalu, and to prepare a crushing counteroffensive. In 1954 the Americans made the accusation: 0°