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v ‘ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED DATE 05-13-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC: HEREIN I5 UNCLASSIFIED @ a 3 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Date of transcription 06/25/2004 SABIR ABD AL AZIZ HUSAYN AL DURI, (Black List #205), date passed to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. of birth May 19, 1949, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents. identified themselves as representatives of the United Sta’ om Washington, DC. FBI Language Specialist provided Arabic/English translation. SABIR provide ie Lollowing information: , During the time frame of 1997-1988, NAZAR KHAZRAJI (phonetic) was the Army Chief of Staff, and ADNAN KHAIRALLAH (phonetic). was the Minister of Defense. In early 1997, HUSAYN RASHID (Black List #131) was the Commander of the Republican Guard in the Sulaminiyah area, and then was named the Deputy Chief of ~ Staff for Operations: According to: SABIR, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations was responsible for carrying out and executing all Army operations. There were two main Directorates under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, which were the Directorate. of Planning and the Directorate of Military Movements. The Directorate of Planning . Was responsible for studying and planning operations for the military. The Directorate of Military Movements was responsible for executing the operational. plans. During this time frame the Director of Military Movements was AYAD FUTAYYIH KHALIFA AL RAWI (Black List #30). AYAD then became the Commander of the Republican Guard when HUSAYN RASHID became the Deputy Chief of Staff. When this occurred NAJEM ABDULLAH (phonetic) took AYAD's position as the Director of Military Movements. MUHAMMAD ADBUL KADER (phonetic) was the Director of Planning then became the Director of Tourism. ‘YUNIS ALTHARAB (phonetic) then replaced KADIR as the Director of Planning. re During the Iran-Iraq War, the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) (Istikhbarat) would gather intelligence on the enemy, Iran, and would disseminate the intelligence to the Minister | of Defense and Army Chief of Staff. The intelligence would then be Because Iraq H : was still at. war with Iran, the intelligence flowed quickly through , the various levels of command. Investigation on __ 06/23/2004 i” Baghdad, Iraq rie # 315E-HQ-14495347!” SSA SSA ‘Date dictated" 06/25/2004 be by b7c ‘This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI It'is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. ‘arin, 262. Tin). 64,.93'2004 b6 b7c