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sion that “enough is enough.” In today’s jargon this is the policy of the minimum deterrent—that is, the possession of a nu- clear force adequate only for a retalia- tory attack on enemy cities but incapa- ble of successful attack on the enemy's nuclear delivery system. It is clear that only a small nuclear delivery system is necessary for a minimum deterrent, One big hydrogen bomb dropped on a big city could kill several millions. The small delivery system must, however, be high- ly invulnerable. Otherwise the enemy might think it possible to bring off a successful “counterforce” first strike, aimed at the destruction of the system. Little operational intelligence is needed for such a minimum deterrent policy because this involves attack on cities, whose locations are known, and does not involve surprise attack on nuclear bases, AIR BURST of # nuclear bomb would maximize ils effects on a city, the most widespread whose locations therefore do not need ef which would be due to heat. This drawing outlines the effects of a 10-megaton bomb set to be known. off at 20,000 feet. At 12 miles (inner colored circle) from “ground zero” the Breball, 34 Oy the political plane, it was thought. miles in diameter, would deliver 30 calories per equare centimeter at a rate sufficient to the resulti iod of ° Jative stabili . ignite virtually all flammable building materials. At 20 miles (outer colored circle) from _ the Tesulting peri relative stability ground zero the heat would be 12 eslories per square centimeter, enough to cause third. WOuld be favorable fcr a serious attempt degree burns and start many fires. Arc extending upward from ground below the burst isa © negotiate a substantial measure of reflected shock weve that would amplify blast effects of the explosion (see drawing below). disarmament, both nuclear and conven- tional. Far-reaching disarmament was seen to be highly desirable, if only be- cause such a balance of terror is stable solely against rational acts of responsible governments. It is not stable against ir- responsible actions of individuals or dis- sident groups or technical accidents. A few suitably placed individuals~a mis- sile crew or the crew of a nuclear bomber on a routine flight—could kill a few mil- tion enemy city dwellers on their own initiative. The best way to reduce this danger is to reduce drastically the num- ber of nuclear weapons on both sides. [ihe second and quite different doc- trine was that the balance of terror was not even stable against rational acts of responsible governments. This was based on the view that a determined nuclear power might be able to launch ® surprise counterforce attack on the enemy's nuclear delivery system of such strength that the enemy would not be able to retaliate. The aggressor, without suffering unacceptable casualties, would then have the enemy at its mercy. The practical consequence of this doctrine is to strive for maximum superiority in number of weapons, maximum invulner- ability of one’s own nuclear delivery sys- MILES 10 o 10 2 tem and maximum intelligence about the RADII OF EFFECTS of 2 10-megaton air burst ure superimposed on # map of St. Louis and basil s puclear eal foree at the surrounding ares. The two colored circles correspond to the colored circles inthe draw. __ Plainly a successful counterforce at- fing at the top of the page. The black circles concern effects due to blast. At a distance of five tack would require knowledge of the lo- miles inner black circle) from ground rero virtually all buildings would be destroyed. cation of all the enemy's nuclear missile At cight miles (outer black circle) virtually all wooden buildings would be destroyed. and air bases and the power to dispatch