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rare @When one particularly heavy-artitfery blast occurred, a stall member remarked that this would mean more in- : jured villagers (mostly women, children, and old men) at the hospital. The next day when I visited the hospi- tal’s orthopedic ward J counted fifty-two people in twen- - ty-fve beds. Some beds held three, some two; in some tases two beds were pulled together for three patients. ‘Two little boys on a stretcher on the floor were the sole survivors of an attack that had wiped out all the rest of their family. I talked toa nurse in the orthopedic ward, to a doctor in the hospital, and to two G.I. medics assigned to the Sospital’s emergency reception center. Each told me, in answer to my questions, that over nine:y per cent of the injuries to these villagers were caused by U.S. bombs and artillery fire. Why Noncombatants Are Attached _ ‘The United States is fighting in Vietnam a war in which it cannot distinguish the enemy combatant from “the civilian villager. Often, no doubt, there is no sharp distinction. In areas declared to be free-fire zones any- thing that moves is fired on, and in any combat area - anyone—man, woman, or child—who tries to fice is likely to be killed. In such a situation callous attitudes toward the innocent become commonplace, ard the normal rights of civilians virtually disappear. The US. armed forces , and civilian employees must carry out their tasks aware | “of the fact that whatever they do or plan is probably being observed by an elusive and resourceful enemy hid- @en among the civilian population—including even that part of the civilian population that works for the Ameri- ans. Thus tactics of mass terror are adopted that include the obliteration of entire areas, the removal of all civil- dans who can be rounded up into concentration points © called refugee camps, and the killing of those who resist. The NLF, on the other hand, move about with con- willages, towns, and cities. There are spectacular instances ere they have come and gone without being hindered tor betrayed by Vietnamese populations presumed to be frelatively “pacified” and friendly. Exchange of fire with athe Americans is usually on the NLF's own initiative and under circumstances offering them an advantage. Only then do they emerge from among the people and join in direct military action. Often their hit-anddis- Bppear tactics, which could not’ possibly work except | ‘among 2 population that will not betray them, operate wo swiftly that they have hit and gone before any precise counteraction can be mounted. + Massive terror tactics, like the U.S. dire-bombing ‘of dhe hillsides outside Quang? Ngai after the NLF jailbreak, sre commonplace i in situations of this sort against an en- siderable freedom over the countryside and within the - harboring within izs amidst a hidden eneiny. They arise, out of military comsidlerations and merality quite similar - to those in World War I] when the Hitler forces would execute a given suriiber of males in a town where an attack on the Gerenan troops had been initiated from within the civiliam population. One difference is that in Vietnam these art@iery and air attacks are more indis- qiminate than were tae Hitler-type executions. Both must “be understood as gersor tactics undertaken by an armed force that has to cops with an enemy who can hide at will within the gemeza] population. At was in this aomosphere that che September elections were held in Quamg 2\gai and throughout the “pacified” sections of South Wiietnam. The actual casting of the ballots seemed in good order except for the fact that in some areas, at least, tthere was no effort made to keep voters from crowdimg, into the voting booths five or even ten at a time. Bur whe counting and the tabulating of the totals Jeft a grea:t deal to be desired: There were enormous discrepancies, never satisfactorily explained; four of the largest mewspapers in Saigon were closed down by government order; and when candidates undertook to hold a joint Press conference after the balloting to voice their criticism oof the election they were dispersed by order of the mayor of Saigon. How Bemnbing Targets Are Chosen One little-knowm Hact bearing on the election is this; before a village in South Vietnam can be bombed or firec: on the military forces must get the approval of the dis: © trict chief. It is ep co him to say whether a village id friendly or hostile. Whe district chiefs all are appointees . of General Ky. It its logical to suppose that when the _Nillagers voted they wvere aware that this was an oppor- tunity to get their “loyalty” into the record against the day when the milicary, might ask permission of the district chief to bomb them. : South Vietnam’s military junta now has had its power somewhat legitimatized; for it to crush any Buddhist and student demonstrations will be easier than before. South Vietnamese who Bane been hoping for a “non-Front™ alternative to the walitary junta will be brought closer to the point where giney must face the hard choice of ac- cepting tmailitary diceztorship and U.S. power or of join- ing the NLF. It is my opinion, ‘based on 2 wide number of con- tacts with Vietnamese of many different types, ages, and Persuasion, that dae Front will continue to grow in ‘strength, since it is mow the only refuge of those who feel © ‘that the massive mZitary intervention of the United - States does gross violence to Vietnam's integrity as 2 nation and robs its people of the sense of their own na* tionhood. More and more Viernamese are coming £0 ‘@ire area which is suspected (and with good reason) ol_this, point of view. . i ar . =. -