◆ SpookStack

production of the atom bomb and other weapons of mass destruction, and the use of fissionable macerials for peaceful purposes only. The problem of timing is undecided; this is discussed below under “Schedule of Arms Reduction.” Ownership & Management Under the circumstances pre- of Atomic Facilities viously described, it would seem wise to abandon the idea of international ownership and management of the world's to hold, manage, licease and inspect would have all the prob- Jems of a noa-owning control organ plus countless more, many of which would contain seeds of discord. The United States has been the chief proponent of inter- national ownership of atomic facilities, and adoption of the above proposal would require her to yield this point. To do so promptly, we believe, would contribute more to reaching agreement on the total problem of disarmament than any “dangerous” atomic facilities, except, perhaps, as the Carnegie Endowment committee has suggested, where nations may elect to place their atomic industries under international trust. Future production must be restricted to quotas defined in appropriate treaties, with the understanding that permissible Production would be subject to the scrictest possible accounting and inspection. Unlimited non-military research using minor Quantities of nuclear fuel would be permitted in national and international laboratories with the understanding that interna- tional laboratory staffs will include representatives of interested countries, and thar all national laboratories will be subject to continuing and thorough inspection. Spokesmen for the West may object thae adoption of these proposals would permit diversion of nuclear fuels and clan- destine activity in sufficient amounts to give strategic advan- tage to an offending nation, That this is a conceivable danger must be admicied, Its prevention will depend upon the scale of production of fissionable material permitted, the competence of the control organ and its staff, the design of the facilicies, the accounting system, and inspection. Given the will to do so, we believe suificient wchnical and scientific know-how can be found to devise the type of administrative organization and controls required to insure competence, responsibility, relia- bility, and dependable indices of compliance. If che control organ is given adequate authority and its staff are competent and impartial, we fait to see how it matters whether they operate as officers of the control organ or as agents of a TVA- like supra-national authority. International ownership might conceivably make the task of inspecting authorized atomic installations a bit easier. But an atomic colossus standing astride the world with authority 30 other concession the United States may reasonably be expeesed to make, Existing Stockpiles of The existence of large stockpiles of Fissionable Materials fissionable materials presents 3 new problem of disarmament planning. Though potentially valuable at some future time for atomic power, these materials need only be placed in atomic bomb cases to render a “peaceful” stockpile a tremendous arsenal for war, Morcover, the bomb cases can easily be concealed, and their secret fabrication, though didicult, would be hard to detect. Huge facilities have been built to refine uranium ore and to coavert it into fissionables. If each aation keeps control of the ambiguously peaceful output of these plants, the temp- tation to keep building up these stockpiles will remain, Vesting the international control organ with legal title co these stockpiles and facilities does not solve this problem if the stockpiles stay where they can be seized and in such form as will permic rapid conversion to bombs. Nor docs “strategic balance,” the solution proposed in the United Nations Majority Plan, seem practicable any longer. This principle would have distributed atomic stockpiles and “dangerous” facilities among the nations so that, if onz nation wrongfully seized the stock- piles and facilities inside irs boundaries, che other nations could legally take over cheirs and so promptly nuilify any military gain co the wrong-doer. But the “balance” this plan requires would be meaningful today only if ic were achieved beeween the Wese and the East. Ir could be reached only if the United States were to turn over a large part of its own atomic stock~ pile to Sovier bloc countries. To expect the United States to do this seems neither realistic nor reasonable. Even though giving custody of national stockpiles to the KT 5