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60. (Continued) ¢ and depending on th Rio pact, This, he indicated,wWxight have the possibility of prevention of action and settlement by political meana, The other course open was the declaration of war. Rusk expressed himself in favor of leaning upon the Rio pact, but does not dismiss the alternative of a unilateral declaration of war as the ultimate action we must take. The alternate is a quick strike. Ambassador Bohlen was not present but his views were expressed in a message which was read in which he strongly advocated diplomatic effort and stated that military action prior te this would be wrong, He urged against action first and then decisive value of discussion. He also stated that limited quick military action was an illusion and that any tnilitary action would rapidly escalate into an invasion, McNamara at this point presented the alternatives referred to the previous day, stating that alternatives one and two were not conclusive and that we would have to resort to alternative 3 and in fact this would lead us ultimately into an invasion. General Taylor generally reviewed the situation stating that the Chiefs looked upon Cuba as a forward base of serious proportions, that it cannot be taken out totally by air; that the military operation would be sizeable, nevertheless necessary. Ambassador Thompson urged that any action be preceeded by a declaration of war; he strongly advocated that we institute a blockade and not resort to military action unless and until it is determined that Castro and Khrushchev refuse to reverse their activities and actually remove the missiles which are now in place. , Secretary Dillon questioned what would be accomplished by talking to Khrushchev. He pointed out that we would probably become engaged in discussions from which we could not extract ourselves and therefore our freedom of action would be frustrated, Dillon was very positive that whatdver action we take should be done without consultation with Khrushchev. Rusk seemed to disagree indicating there was a possibility that Khrushchev might be persuaded to reduce his efforts but he admitted also that he might .step them up as a result of discussions. President Kennedy was non-committal, however he seemed to continually raise questions of reactions: of our allies, NATO, South America, public opinion and others. Raised the question whether we Va ‘should not move the missiles out of Turkey. All readily agreed they were not much use but a political question was involved. Bundy thought this a good idea either under conditions of a strike or during & preliminary talk. ,