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60. (Continued) y e wa soy. .. 4 | | | | | McNamara discussed in some detail the effecta of a strike [ indicating that we could expect several hundred Soviet citizens to be } killed; he pointed out that all of the Sam sites were manned exclusively ! by Soviets and a great many Soviet technicians were working on the “MRBMs and at the air fields. He agreed that we could move out of | Turkey and Italy; pointed out the political complications. At this point McNamara seemed to be reconsidering his prior position of advocating military action and laid special emphasis on the fact that the price of Soviet retaliation, whether in Berlin or elsewhere, would be very high and we would nat de able to contral it. Secretary Ball throughout the conversation maintained the position that strike without warning was not acceptable and that we should not proceed without discugsion with Khrushchev. President Kennedy then said that he thought at some point Khrushchev would say that if we made a move against Cuba, he would take Berlin. McNamara surmised perhaps that was the price we must pay and perhaps we'd lose Berlin anyway. There followed an exchange of view on the possibility of the Soviets taking Berlin and our prospect of retaining it. . i { | I i 4 { | | | President Kennedy rather summed up the dilemma atating that action of a type contemplated wauld be opposed by the alliance - on the other hand, lack of action will create disunity, lack of confidence | and disintegration of our several alliances and friendly relations with | countries who have confidence in us. 1 ‘ As a result of discussions of the "price" of a strike, there followed a long discussion of the possibilities of a blockade, the advantages of it, and manner in which it would be carried out, etc, There seemed to be differences of opinion as to whether the blockade should be total, or should only involve military equipment which would mean blockading Soviet ships. Also there were continued references to blockading ships carrying offensive weapons and there seemed to be a differentiation inthe minds of some in the policy of blockading offensive weapons as contrasted to blockading all weapons. There followed discussion aa to policies the President should follow with respect to calling Congress into session, asking for a declaration of war, advising the country and authorizing action. Thompson continued to insist that we must communicate with Khrushchev. There was a discussion concerning the President's meeting with Gromyko and the position he should take should the Cuban question core up. The President was advised to draw Gromyko out and it was indicated he probably would receive a flat denial that there were any offensive weapons in Cuba.