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ADocumentaryHistoryOfTheCubanMissileCrisis1962
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64. ‘Continued:
~£-C-R~E-T
to tkese cf the US would te strongly disccureged. It seexs clear
thst, especially over tke long run, there would be a less cf con-
fidence in US rcwer ard deterriraticn ami a sericus decline of 1S
infliuerce gexerally.
EFPSCT CG WARRING
5 If the US confrcrts Khruskchev with its %mcwledse of the
| MREM deployrent ard preeses for a withdrawal, we do rot believe the
Soviets would kalt tie Geployrent. Instead, they would propose
negotiations on the general question of foreign bases, claining
equal right to establish Soviet bases and assuring the US of tight
control over the missiles. They would probably link Cuba with the
Berlin situation and emphasize their patience and preference for
negotiations, implying that Berlin was held hostage to US acticns
in Cuba.
6. There 4s some slight chance that a warning to Castro mght
meke a differerce, sirce the Soviets covld regard this eas a chance
to sterd aside, but it also weuld give time for offers to negotiate,
ecrtirced builéup, ard coumterpressures, and we think tke result in
the exd vould be tke sere,
199
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