◆ SpookStack

111. (Continued, moasenvcus sign ; Tenning to another important aspect of the intelligence - _ . unction, we Tind th in the anéiysis cl inteliigance . f in the production of curr intelligence reports, ° @ community Petlec to g2e across v Government ¢ . ost gocurste possible picture of tne Soviets ‘ t in Guba, during the menths preces Gotober 14, ‘ of this conelusion is not ciniinis by the fact nat is @z3ier to enoiy than reresigic determining i pth @ of particuler indicators incius n the mass. of : i le for intelligence enaiysis. . - We pelieve that the near-totel intelligence surprise ‘ experienced by the United Staves with respect to the intrcducticn and deployment of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba vesnited in large part from a msifunetion ef the enalytic process by which intsiligence indiestors are assessed and rerort2d, This maifunction diminished the effectiveness oF policy advisers, navionel intelli- gence estimators, and civilian end military officers having command responsibilities. e believe that- the manner in whien intelligence indicators xr Gled in the Cuba situation may well be tne most sericus cur intelligence system, and.one which, i7 ect ad to the gravest conssquencsas, ajor consequsnecs were ths PoOlldwing: (1) Our Goverment wes net provided with tne degree of early warning of hostile intenticns and capabilities which snould have been derived-from the indicators contained in the incoming intelligence, ° . (2} Neither you nor your principal policy advisers were | _ rovided at epproeprviate intervals with meaningful, cumulative - assessments of the available intelligence indicators, Hac the j : ce community systematics | ~ compilations oF eccumula | ft : viate oolicy-level Lopments i : ive courses . me : @ Cubs sit te Rouse 367