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to Barnes, would object because such intensive attacks would clearly indicate that the US was behind- the op- eration and then the Cubans could make a case in the UN which would be difficult for the us representatives to handle. Barnes went on to suggest that: All of us try to eliminate important opposition whether air or land by all possible means other than air strikes. Various types of sabotage are, of course, obvious alternatives. If the Cuban air strength remains as deficient as it now appears to be and if some sabotage opera- tions can be effected, it would seem that air strikes in support of the landing could be restricted to a small number of planes directed at relatively few targets and making their attack early on the morning of the landing. By relatively few planes, I have in mind, a maximum of three. 121/ Barnes believed that the small number of aircraft would provide a rationale for blaming the attacks on the FRO -- that the FRO could have financed a small number of aircraft, but they could not possibly finance the large number of B-26's being acquired in the JMATE inventory. In his 28 December 1960 response to Barnes's memorandum, Jake Esterline conceded that it was infeas- ible to expect a two-week period of air strikes prior to the landing; and Esterline said that neither he nor - 91 -