◆ SpookStack

Col. Hawkins had seriously considered that possibility. Chief, WH/4 did stress the fact that a three day period of intensive air strikes could be a critical factor in the success of plans against Castro. He did, how- ever, recognize that there was a political problem for the US Government in continuing the air strikes over this length of time, and he went on to suggest: Recognizing, however, the difficult political problem this creates for the government community, an acceptable com- promise would be D-Day minus one. This compromise is somewhat risky as new in- formation coming in from controlled and sensitive sources indicates a formidable array of retaliatory power being pulled together by CASTRO. Nevertheless, we believe we can live with this compromise if the D-Day minus one strike is made in sufficient strength to ensure negation of the Cuban capability. I might add that this concept was discussed at some length with Ambassador Wilhauer, who seemed to· think he could live with it in his dealings with the Special Group. 122/* Barnes apparently was indefatigable, for on the same day that Esterline was addressing the above * Emphasis by author. This reference to the possi- bility of a pre D-Day air strike -- D minus I -- as acceptable to Chief, WH/4 is important in a later part of the story of air operations. This is the earliest positive reference that the author found in the record. - 92 -