◆ SpookStack

aircraft with unidentical tail numbers would make the first strikes, and then the third aircraft -- with an identical tail number to one of the other aircraft would make its pass. The theory was that this would make the Cubans believe that a total of only four aircraft were engaged in the strike at San Antonio and Libertad. In fact, this proved to be the case at least for a few days: for Castro, in his 23 April 1961 TV spectacular on the invasion, specified that there had been two aircraft at each of the three airfields. 12/* Another of the problems that faced the planners of the D-2 operation concerned procedures regarding both US Navy and US Air Force aircraft. USN aircraft operating in the area of Nicaragua and Cuba during the initiation of tactical air operations were advised to stay clear of both the south coast of Cuba and of Nicaraguan air space. TIDE reported that Nicaraguan Air Force P-51's had been alerted to intercept any nonscheduled aircraft approaching the TIDE base. * Castro observed the attack on Libertad from the nearby General Staff quarters where he was attending a meeting. - 190 -