◆ SpookStack

almost exclusively to the opposition from Adlai Steven- son, the United States Ambassador to the. United Nations. Some have contended that Stevenson was fully briefed about both the planned D-2 air strike and the subse- quent D-Day air strike others are less sure about the degree of Stevenson's knowledgeability. Because it has been established that Stevenson was given a briefing on the planned invasion on 8 April 1961 by a CIA representative, for many he has become the villain in the piece. For this reason a serious effort has been made to determine the degree of Stevenson's (and his UN colleagues') knowledgeability regarding the planned air operations against Castro's Forces. The D-Day air strike was to be against both Castro's air force and Cuba's principal military and communications installations; but as the planning . . ' progressed, the 0 m1nus 2 str1ke was evolved both as insurance for keeping Castro's Air Force on the ground~ and politically it was intended to help maintain the fiction of plausible deniability. By late January 1961 when the DCI, the DDCI, the President, and the JCS were all given briefings on the PM aspects of Project JMATE, references were made to a 0-1 air - 236 -