◆ SpookStack

strike. When briefed on 31 January 1961, the JCS representatives queried the wisdom of the 0-1 air strike because they were afraid that it would alert the Cuban forces to the imminence of an invasion. The Agency's response was that while this might be true, the risk of having Castro's aircraft in opposition to the landing was grea~er than the possibility of an alert that would result from the pre-O-Oay strike.* The responsibility for briefing Ambassador Stevenson on 8 April 1961 at the UN Headquarters in New York City was delegated to C. Tracy Barnes, A/OOP/A. What Barnes was instructed to tell about the.upcoming operation and what he told has been the subject of much speculation; but the Agency has been charged with everything from outright deception to sheer ineptnessr-;;: terms of the Stevenson briefing. \ In his book One Thousand Days, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who was then a member of the Kennedy White House Staff, spoke of the briefing as follows: * In fact, it was reported that the DCI tended to agree with the JCS in this evaluation, but "General Cabell [the DDCI] said he would hold firm on the con- cept that D-l is necessary, but that his compromise position with the Director would be that strikes on D-l.would not take place before the afternoon of said day, extending into the morning of the attack." 76/ - 237 -