◆ SpookStack

base in Nicaragua. The commo facility was physically located in our DPD com- pound. It increased and expedited the traffic, and gave us a direct control ••. to the unit. It was almost a vertical command link directly to the commander in the field. The field commander re- ported directly to us, and we could pro- vide any report, or support, required by our field units. It was difficult for us to work down in the WH/4 facilities since all our communications with our units had to be conducted at 1717 H St. We would, however, keep Hawkins and the people in the Western Hemisphere Division informed about what we were doing; but we still had to come back to 1717 H to run the communications. If I am confusing you, it is because I am trying to layout the framework in which we were working to show you that it was a logical arrangement ••• that it wasn't a bastard organization which was unable to provide the proper support to JMATE. 15/ In his retrospective view of the chain of command problem between DPD and WH/4, Col. Beerli was extremely critical of the approach taken by Gen. Maxwell Taylor during the course of the Taylor Committee's review of the Bay of Pigs Operation.* Beerli pointed out that wha~ Taylor attempted to do was to draw some sort of an admission that there was friction between DPD and the Western Hemisphere. There wasn't. * Established by President Kennedy, the other committee members were Robert Kennedy, Adm. Arleigh Burke, and Allen Dulles.