◆ SpookStack

responsible for the tr~ining and the paramilitary employment of the Cuban Brigade. Hawkins not only went on record early in October 1960 suggesting that the chain of command left something to be de?ired, but his subsequent post-mortem of project JMATE and his comments to the Taylor Committee indicated tnat the lack of more direct control of the air operations by WH/4 was an important factor contributing to the failure. 18/* . Jake Esterline, Chief of Project JMATE, also was quite frank in his expressions of displeasure with the relationships between WH/4 and DPD: I never felt that we had adequate con- trol of our air arm. This was a very un- satisfactory relationship. Mr. Bissell wanted it that way. We didn1t like it. As a matter of fact, the only two people we could work effectively with at that time were [Col. George] Gaines who was a very practical airman and Gar Thorsrud. 19/ Esterline also engaged in the following exchange on management of air operations with an interviewer:** * When contacted by the author of this volume regard- ing an oral interview, Colonel Hawkins refused on the grounds of ill health -- he was just recovering from hospitalization and faced even more -- and the fact that his post-mortem report for the Taylor Committee adequately told all that he had to tell about the Bay of Pigs. ** The author of this history. - 18 -