◆ SpookStack

to Castro, for such preparations as he made with his forces were obviously in response to the D-2 strike rather than to . 103/ other information which he might have had. It is clear that the landings at Playa Giron and Playa Larga caught the Cubans by surprise--this despite the contrary suggestions made by earlier witnesses who claimed that the invasion forces probably had been spotted by Castro people in the light house of Cayo Guano.* Secretary Rusk had objections to what he identified as the operational. aspects of the anti-Castro effort. Included among the points he made in this connection were the fact that "these covert matters are handled on such a restricted basis that the resources of the departments are not brought to bear." tAs mentioned earlier no one on the committee raised any questions with Secretary Rusk about his own failure to check with State's intelligence people on such matters, for example, as the prospects for support of the anti-Castro effort from dissident elements within Cuba.) Secretary Rusk also supported the view expressed by earlier witnesses from the Department of Defense that having planning and action papers written out would have been helpful, but he did caution that this might have resulted in the distribution of so many pieces of paper as to jeopardize a given activity. Further, Secretary Rusk found difficulty with the piecemeal nature of the briefings on the anti-Castro operation and * Admiral Clark in particular. 104