◆ SpookStack

urged USN air support. The conclusion of these sorts of inconsistencies came in the following remark: There was no one involved that didn't recognize that this was a risky business and that failure would be costly. However, we overestimated the international effects of failure and underestimated the effects of failure on this town. 104/ Presumably the view that the country suffered more from self-flagellation than it did through loss of respect in the international arena should have been dispelled by US action during the missile crisis in Cuba in 1962; but among other actions, the pervasive presence of Cuban surrogates in Third World countries in the more than 20 years since the collapse at the Bay of Pigs gives one cause to question the judgment of the Secretary of State who insured Castro's victory. Certainly his testimony before the Taylor Committee raises questions about his integrity.* * Less than two years after this self-protective testimony, Rusk took another hard shot at CIA when the BOP operation came up during a session with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. On 16 January 1~63, Rusk testified: II It is also true that in terms of the deficiencies of information that turned up after the event, that the count of planes on the island from sources on the island as well as other sources turned out to be inaccurate. There were some planes in hangars and so forth that were not hit with the strike that did take place, and more planes, in fact, turned out from the Cuban side than had been anticipated." Rusk's comments were completely unsupported by any evidence that had surfaced since the collapse of the invasion (or to the time of the writing of this volume). 106