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"fair" chance with full-scale air operations, it should have been obvious that anything less would lead (as it did) to defeat. Memorandum No. 1 of the Taylor Committee also stated that the representative of the Joint Staff who visited the infantry and air training facilities in Guatemala reported that both the ground and air units were well trained and that the expectation of initial success was good. The CSG memorandum did emphasize, as had the report of the JCS evaluators, that failure to gain control of the air over Cuba would seriously jeopardize the whole operation and that survival of a single Castro combat aircraft armed with .50 caliber machine guns could sink all or most of the invasion vessels. As discussed earlier the probability of such sinkings was regarded as inconsequential by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the President when they 12/ cancelled the D-Day air strike. Memorandum No. 1 then reviewed the discussions which took place following CIA's 11 March 19.61 presentation of the Trinidad plan and the President's request for a quieter, more deniable type ot operation which resulted in the evolution of the Zapata plan. During the Taylor Committee hearings, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that they had informed the Secretary of Defense that none of the alternative plans, in- cluding Zapata, was "as feasible and likely to have accomplished the objective as the basic [Trinidad] paramilitary plan." Memorandum No. 1 reported that: