◆ SpookStack

plan--"a compromise was reached with regard to the air plan. Early in April, it was decided to stage limited air strikes on D-2 at the time of the diversionary landing of 160 men 14/ to be made in eastern Cuba. II The suggestion that the D-2 air strike was evolved as a compromise in response to State's objection is a novel thesis, unsupported by the record. The question of softening, pre-D-Day air strikes had been under consideration as early as 8 December 1960, and was the sUbject of continuing interest from that date. Moreover, there was never any implication that the D-2 effort was intended to reduce the level of the D-Day attack. Taylor Committee Memorandum No.1, however, emphasised that the political advantages were the basic reason for the D-2 deception/defection operation; and reported: "Mr. Bissell of CIA also later stated at a meeting on April 6 that CIA would prefer to conduct an all-out air strike on the morning of D-Day rather than perform the D-2 defection strikes followed 15/ by limited strikes on D-Day." Bissell, of course, was never given the D-Day choice; and, in fact, Bissell--with Colonel Hawkins and Tracy Barnes--was one of the originators of the D-2 air strike for added insurance to guarantee the _grounding of Castro\s combat aircraft.* * If Bissell were presented with this choice, his response was most logical. This is the only reference the writer has seen which suggests that the D-2 strike was intended to reduce the level of the planned D-Day strikes. '),1211;,; ~ . ", , . - • j