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4. Far more serious was the loss of the freighters RIO ESCONDIDO and HOUSTON through air attack at about 0930 on the morning of April 17. The RIO was a particular loss as it had ten days of reserve ammunition on board, as well as other important supplies. 5. Thtl air attack which sunk these ships caused all others in the landing area to put out to sea with the order to rendezvous 50 miles off the coast. The freighters ATLANTICO and CARIBE headpd south and never stopped until intercepted by the U.S. Navy at points 110 and 218 miles respectively south of Cuba. 6. The CARIBE was so far away that its cargo, principally aviation supplies, was never available for movement to Blue Beach while the fight lasted. The ATLANTICO, which had considerable ammunition on board, did rejoin the other ships of the expedition at 1816, April 18 at a point about 50 miles ~~~:th of the beach and transferred her supplies to the waiting two LCls and 3 LCUs for a night run to the beach. 7. By the time the supplies were transferred and the convoy had started north it was too late to hope to resupply the beach under cover of darkness. The convoy commander asked CIA operational headquarters, Washington, for destroyer es~ort and U.S. N~vy jet cover without which he believed that he would lose his ships to air attack the next morning. He added that without U. S. Ne.vy support the Cuban crew would mutiny if sent back to the beach. I (