◆ SpookStack

Col. Beerli's strong feelings about the failure of the Navy to get the time period for the CAP correct are sUbjective, but there is less speculative evidence which adds credence to the Agency's contention that the Navy clearly was at fault on 19 April 1961--regardless of whether the B-26s arrived an hour earlier than scheduled. Admiral Clark told the Taylor Committee that the Essex was unaware of the approaching B-26s until "they came over our ship one hour early." Also according to Clark, by the time he launched his CAP and got them over the beach, the B-26s "had already made their strikes and left." 10/ At no time did any of the USN personnel testifying before the Taylor Committee Cincluding Admiral Burke of the Committee) indicate that the incoming B-26s had been picked up by radar on the Essex or on the radar of the escorting destroyers. Estimates based on the intercept ranges for the radars installed on the Essex (as of November 1960-June 1961) indicate that B-26s flying at a speed of 230 mph, between altitudes of 500' and 10,000', could have been picked up between 45 and 154 statute miles from the carrier. This would have provided the carrier with an advance warning of roughly 12-40 minutes. 11/* Although it cannot be determined accurately at what height any of the brigade's B-26s were flying, Gar Teegen was of the opinion that they probably would have been cruising at S,OOO-lO,OOO' for the early part of the trip, dropping down to * See Table 2 following p. 11.